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Introduction 
The term ‘global imbalances’ has recently come to describe the latest formation 
of increasingly large disparities in the balance of the international current accounts of 
main world regions, notably the US and Asia. Considered a warning signal of 
international financial instability, it is also being seen as a symptom of current world 
asymmetries in policy regimes and growth rates. Addressing the problem should 
thus aim at setting world growth on more solid ground, and begin to tackle the true 
global imbalances of today’s world.1 In this global scenario, the single currency area 
in Europe (or: Euroland) is a new player. How does the euro economy navigate in 
the midst of international payments imbalances? And what can Euroland do to 
contribute to correct global payments imbalances in such a way as to play a role 
within the broader scope to rebalance the course of world economic development?  
Judging from the current triad of EU policies (namely, federally-implemented 
price stability, federally-constrained fiscal balance of national budgets, and a 
prescription that countries accomplish structural reforms on an individual basis), 
Euroland’s potential contributing role to a benign rebalancing of global imbalances 
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seems hampered by the fact that Euroland has limited means to solve its own 
internal imbalances. In fact, the effort to shape, in a slow growth environment, a 
more competitive and dynamic economy through individual countries’ initiatives 
guided by the ’open method of coordination’, and not by way of common 
governance, may keep Euroland busy for a long time, a time during which the 
external environment may rapidly change and become less favorable. Common 
governance established by common monetary policy and a common exchange rate is 
yet insufficient to make significant steps towards reducing traditional divergences in 
the areas of social and labor policies, dynamics of unit labor costs, budget and 
taxation decisions, thus augmenting the strains of euro members rather than 
multiplying their potential, as documented elsewhere in this volume. This also 
indicates little alertness on the part of Euroland’s architects regarding the distinct 
possibility that current world developments may turn against Euroland and force it 
to facing considerable challenges. Indeed, as argued in this chapter, virtually all 
scenarios of international payments ’rebalancing’ currently considered entail 
problematical consequences for Euroland, and a more resolute willingness to actively 
play a global role seems not only to be wished for, but a condition for the success of 
the EMU project. Adopting a proper system of macroeconomic governance in a truly 
integrated single market, as warranted by its new currency, is one of those structural 
reforms that should be given priority in the interest of Europe. 
 
The widening of international financial imbalances  
The recent wave of concern for ’global imbalances’ in international payments 
dates from the late 1990s when a persistently growing US current account deficit 
becomes concurrent with a persistently growing negative net international 
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investment position of the US. Until then, the question of the sustainability of current 
account deficits and international debt had been studied exclusively with reference to 
developing and emerging countries.  With the escalating excess of foreign-owned 
assets in the US over US-owned assets abroad, however, there developed concerns 
that financial flows to the US could reverse, thus engendering a financial and dollar 
crisis.2 
A full parallel with the financial dependence of developing and emerging 
countries, however, is unwarranted: the external account deficit on goods, services 
and income payments of the country issuing the world key currency is not subject to 
the same financial constraints as that of any other country. In providing the world 
with international liquidity, the US issues dollar-denominated claims that the rest of 
the world demands as a means of payment for acquiring financial assets in the US, as 
well as for trading with third parties (as most of the international invoicing is 
denominated in dollars). The accounting imbalances thus reflect, in fact, a market 
equilibrium condition between demand and supply of dollars. As compared to the 
situation of a developing country where debts are denominated in a currency that the 
country cannot issue, the fact that virtually all external outstanding liabilities of US 
economic units are denominated in dollars softens the US borrowing constraint. This 
gives the US the privilege of a longer time horizon available before the external 
financing constraint begins to bite. Indeed, and to many’s surprise, the US imbalance 
position survived with no dramatic repercussions in the afermath of the dot-com 
bubble and the ensuing recession: an array of US macroeconomic policies targeted at 
domestic growth set both the tone of the dollar in floating currency markets and the 
tone of policy steering in countries that were willing to follow (i.e., peg) the dollar. 
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The result was that the US went back on a growth track and its current account 
continued to enlarge. 
With the turn of the century, the US financial imbalance has continued to 
increase while Latin America, emerging Asia and oil-exporting economies have 
reversed their external deficit positions into increasing current account surpluses.  
Figure 13.1 documents the changing set of international financial positions by 
relating the current account balances of selected world regions to domestic (private 
and public) financial balances, through the 1995-2005 decade. From national and 
flow-of-funds accounting we know that the following identity holds for each 
accounting system: 
Private sector net borrowing + Public sector net borrowing = Current account 
deficit.3 
The diagonal line in Figure 13.1 shows combinations of private and public accounts 
that deliver a balanced current account position. The actual current account balance 
of each country (or region) is identified—at three dates of observation (1995, 2000, 
and 2005)—by plotting private net borrowing against public net borrowing: the 
resulting distance from the ‘Current Account (CA)=0’ line measures a deficit (if a 
combination lies to the right of the line) or a surplus (if to the left). 
In the decade considered, it is worth noting how the widening of the US 
external deficit has persisted, irrespectively of the changing combinations of private 
and public borrowing patterns: the external deficit was concurrent, in 1995, with a 
government deficit; in 2000, with a government surplus that was more than offset by 
private net borrowing; and in 2005, with both private and public net borrowing. The 
growing external deficit reflects an ongoing theme of the US economy that has 
endured unaffected by changing cyclical conditions and policies: an increasing excess 
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of domestic demand over domestic product, with corresponding demand spillover 
effects on the rest of the world. 
The Asian pattern is quite different, as the current account position of emerging 
Asian countries reversed in the period considered. In 1995, net public borrowing was 
concurrent with an external deficit that then turned into a rising external surplus in 
2000 and 2005, when rising private savings (and profits) more than offset fiscal 
deficits. Not only the US and Asia are now on opposite courts with respect to the 
‘CA=0’ line, but they have now reached antithetical positions. When we consider, in 
addition, the reversal (from surplus to deficit) of external account positions of Latin 
America and oil-exporting countries, the deficit court remains near empty, with the 
notable exceptions of the UK, Australia, emerging Eastern Europe, and only a few 
countries now incorporated into the euro currency area, while Euroland as a whole 
has, in its brief history, gravitated near the ‘CA=0’ line in spite of relatively large 
swings in fiscal balances, mostly offset by corresponding swings in private sector’s 
financial balances. 
Such polarization between the US, on the deficit side, and the rest of the world, 
on the surplus side, is particularly meaningful if one considers that countries that 
consistently belong to opposite sides of the ‘CA=0’ line pursue very different growth 
strategies. A country on the right side of the line is a country that generates net 
savings (including profits) abroad by means of expanding demand by domestic units 
(and for both domestic and foreign units, depending on its marginal propensity to 
expend and import) financed by private and/or public deficits. By contrast, a 
country on the left side is a country that absorbs net savings (including profits) from 
abroad by means of an expanding demand for domestic units (and by foreign and 
domestic units, depending on its marginal propensity to expend and import) 
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financed abroad. Considering that any external deficit requires the disposal of a 
means of payment accepted internationally and that any external surplus entails 
accumulating such means of payment, then, for the time a region lays to the right of 
the ‘CA=0’ line, it is a net generator of world demand and a demander of 
international finance, and for the time it lays to the left of the line, it is a net dragger 
of world demand and a supplier of international finance.  
Asia moved over to the left of the ‘CA=0’ line following the 1998 crisis.4 This 
conspicuous reversal of a growing number of developing and emerging countries in 
Asia, and elsewhere, is likely to reflect an increasing reluctance of being in the risky 
court of net world demand generators. The 1998 crisis showed that, apart from the 
privileged position of the key currency country, such condition is tolerated for 
limited time periods before capital flows reverse. Successful growth-oriented policies 
in the US that prevented the world recession that many had foreseen in the aftermath 
of the stock market crisis corroborated this choice. 
While these developments have led to the widening of current account 
disparities, financial and currency markets continue to play a crucial role in 
maintaining this ’equilibrium of imbalances’. The dollar provides the key world 
currency, while other currencies of higher and lower hierarchy have acquired 
liquidity at various degrees relying on their capital markets. The sizeable widening 
of the US current account deficit in a context of sustained world growth (and 
increasing polarization of current account imbalances as described above) has been 
made possible by the world’s appetite for dollar-denominated assets. From a purely 
accounting view, the re-cycling of dollar liquidity back to the US is a precondition to 
prevent that spending income abroad drains liquidity in the US. In this sense, foreign 
investment in US assets has provided a method equivalent to the one Keynes 
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considered essential to any international monetary ’system’, as well as an element of 
his own proposal for reform, i.e., ’a method by which the surplus credit balances 
arising from international trade, which the recipient does not wish to employ for the 
time being, can be set to work … without detriment to the liquidity of these balances 
and to their holder’s faculty to employ them himself when he desires to do so’ 
(Keynes 1980, 169).  
At the same time, the significant widening of imbalances was made possible by 
the fact that another element Keynes considered essential is missing in today’s 
‘system’, i.e., ’an internal stabilizing mechanism, by which pressure is exercised on 
any country whose balance of payments with the rest of the world is departing from 
equilibrium in either direction, so as to prevent movements which must create for its 
neighbors an equal but opposite want of balance’ (ibid.). This was a missing element 
in the Bretton Woods system as well, and one that contributed to its demise. Indeed, 
when drawing parallels between historical international payments systems,5 one 
should be reminded that this remains today an element of weakness.  
In sum, financial imbalances will continue as long as both surplus nations and 
the largest deficit nation do not feel the need to adjust, and this is being seen today as 
leading to either of two scenarios. Under a Classical view, the widening and 
polarization of imbalances just cannot go on forever as it increases the vulnerability 
of the international economy: if less-than-efficient market mechanisms have not 
prevented the built-up of an excessively unbalanced situation, then an abrupt crisis 
can only be avoided by returning quickly to ’sound policies’.6 Under an alternative 
view, imbalances may continue unchecked as long as they remain coherent with a 
world system that combines different, complementary strategies: the current system 
of dollar-dominated international financial markets permits export-led countries to 
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recycle their surpluses back to deficit countries (i.e., the US) and hence prevents a US 
slowdown, with the US and Asia keeping the world in balance by pulling in opposite 
directions. Even under this less dramatic scenario, however, there remain several 
elements of concern, including a higher capital mobility (than under the Bretton 
Woods system) and the dependence of the local stability of this system on mutual 
interest, including an enduring compatibility with domestic US objectives. A 
situation where world stability requirements under this latter scenario should 
conflict with the domestic goals of the key world currency, such as a surge in US 
inflation, would be a real threat to the dollar-based recycling of financial imbalances, 
and thus to world growth. 
 
Risks of a US-Asian adjustment  
Most economists agree that current ’global imbalances’ pose a real threat to the 
world economy, but the same diagnosis and therapy are not shared by all. Inevitably, 
the character of solutions strictly depends on the goals one sets, and in the debate of 
diverse, alternative and competing policies one must first clarify the goal they aim at. 
In this respect, the IMF (2005, 2006) has expressed serious concerns that the widening 
of financial imbalances may prove to be only temporarily sustainable and that the 
current pattern will have to be unwounded by dollar depreciation as foreigners will 
be increasingly reluctant to hold dollar-denominated assets. In the face of an 
increasing vulnerability, the IMF has warned that financial imbalances require policy 
correction and, if left unchecked, will correct through an abrupt and risky dollar 
drop. In describing the aims of a policy coordination effort, the IMF is thus stressing 
the goal of reducing the danger of a financial meltdown ignited by a dollar collapse.  
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This may well be a concern for the world economy, and the analysis will return 
to this issue below. Yet, there exists an equally, if not more important, concern that 
should guide policy action: US internal economic conditions and policy choices 
remain crucial to world economic growth as long as the majority of countries are 
highly dependent on US demand. In fact, the risk is that a weakening of the 
American economy may ignite a global recession. 
This difference in diagnosis and goals matters because while dollar stability 
may require that adjustment falls predominantly on the US, and possibly on Asian 
pegging policies, a reduction of the world economic dependence on US consumers 
and business may lead us to consider adjustment on other players, notably, and 
perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, Euroland. Indeed, one should not disregard 
that some of the policies endorsed by the IMF do in fact consider the latter concern, 
prodding a boosting of growth in Japan and Europe, thus indicating the need to 
widen the effort to generate demand engines beyond the US. Yet, the IMF’s biggest 
emphasis remains on the dollar stability concern, aiming at re-equilibrating actions 
(such as a reduction of US private and public net borrowing) that could easily prove 
counterproductive to demand and growth, thus further increasing the risk of the 
world economy running out of steam.  
By combining some key contributions on the question of imbalances, the IMF 
promotes adoption of a coordinated package of policies: fiscal measures in the US to 
spur private saving and cut the federal deficit, exchange rate flexibility, and reforms 
that spur domestic demand in surplus countries. Thus, the IMF prescribes a 
constellation of policies, in consideration of the fact that imbalances are common to a 
number of regions and that rebalancing international payments must necessarily 
entail both a reduction of deficit positions and a reduction of surplus positions. 
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Entrusting both substitution and income effects, policies are expected to foster an 
orderly market adjustment by providing exchange rate flexibility in Asia and fiscal 
consolidation in the US before market movements become disruptive, and spur 
growth predominantly through policies that enhance productivity in Europe and 
Japan and lead to increased spending by oil exporters. 
When it comes to priorities, however, pundits hold different views. An 
influential view places an exceptional emphasis upon the US imbalance position and 
the need that US policy makers change their course of action and begin to restore 
’sound policies’. One can find a number of apparently intuitive and yet questionable 
reasons why most of the adjustment of existing imbalances should fall on the US: 
First, while the surplus side of global imbalances is shared by, and spread among, a 
number of world regions, the deficit side concentrates on US external accounts: over 
two thirds of all external deficits originate from the US. This has unwarrantedly 
suggested that because the anomaly sits primarily in one country, adjustment should 
be made at the US domestic level. The fact that the US is the world region furthest 
away from ’equilibrium’, however, does not warrant that it is the region that must 
adjust first. Should the US attempt to reduce imbalances by cutting down the flow of 
savings they generate abroad to increase domestic savings, while others continue to 
attempt to “import” savings from abroad, an ‘international paradox of thrift’ 
situation would develop: a demand drop that would reduce income and investment 
and actually result in less, not more world savings. Slowing down the biggest 
demand engine could only make sense if first demand would be rising elsewhere. 
The point is that this cannot happen as long as Asian and key European countries 
remain strongly oriented to use exports as their demand engine.  
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Another reason for commonly emphasizing the need for US adjustment lays in 
the conventional argument that a deficit country faces a financing (though in the case 
of the US ’soft’) constraint, while surplus countries do not: the US may have more 
leeway than emerging countries, but ultimately it must adjust. This asymmetry is 
often described as being one between (borrowing) countries indulging in spending 
profligacy and (lending) countries practicing frugality. Finally, the 2000-03 dramatic 
reversal of US fiscal accounts has provided an additional source of concern for US 
fiscal sustainability in the face of an increasing outstanding net foreign holding of 
Treasury securities. A group of American economists have vigorously blamed both 
the excessively low personal saving rate and the looming budget deficit in the US for 
reducing national saving and creating the needs of a rising borrowing from abroad to 
’finance domestic investment’. In their view, rising debt bears on Americans both for 
the returns that must be paid on debt and for the increased risk that this may entail, 
eventually driving US interest rates up, 7 pushing the dollar as well as investor 
confidence and the stock market down, and thus spreading to the real economy: 
’These same forces could lead investors and businesses to scale back use of the dollar 
as the leading world currency for international transactions. That, in turn, could limit 
the ability of the US to finance its current account deficits through dollar-
denominated liabilities and thus increase the nation’s net exposure to substantial 
exchange rate changes’ (Rubin, Orszag and Sinai 2004, p.32).  
This connection between US fiscal soundness and the global role of the dollar is 
questionable in at least two respects.  Regarding the fears that a dollar drop implies 
an enduring dollar crisis, due considerations should be given to the following: the 
dollar has proved it can stand large fluctuations in its international value with no 
impact on the stability and liquidity of US financial markets. Investors’ activity in 
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temporarily reallocating international portfolios does not create conditions whereby 
the dollar loses its appeal as key world currency. Arguably, should ’unwarranted 
fears’ develop, initiating a dollar crisis, the most powerful central bank in the world 
would be operative, and other central banks would be highly interested to cooperate 
to protect their domestic investors and their own portfolios, until an orderly dollar 
market is restored.  
On the other hand, should fiscal retrenchment, or tax hikes, in the US, 
unaccompanied by a rising US private net borrowing, move the US towards current 
account balance (i.e., towards the ‘CA=0’ line in Figure 13.1), this would be 
concomitant with a reduction of the surplus imbalance elsewhere. Restoring ’sound 
policies’ in the US would thus prove counterproductive, it would reduce the US net 
generation of world demand and be deflationary for the US and the world. It could 
well contribute to moving regions in Figure 13.1 towards the ‘CA=0’ line, but at the 
cost of a generalized reduction of US and world growth. Considering the relative 
importance of the US economic engine, the effect could be devastating if demand did 
not increase first elsewhere in the world.8  
When the deflationary effects of unilateral US adjustment are considered, one 
should begin looking elsewhere. A conventional alternative recipe is exchange rate 
adjustment, and this would involve a policy effort by the Asian countries, notably 
China. Considered as a way to address concerns about the deflationary effects of a 
unilateral US adjustment, the aim is to simultaneously restore ’sound policies’ in the 
US (by increasing US savings) and in Asia (by eliminating exchange controls), and 
ultimately to guide a price adjustment. In this vision, a concerted effort of the US and 
Asia to adjust imbalances bilaterally through a reduction of the US fiscal deficit 
parallel to Asian currencies’ appreciation9 would lead to an orderly global 
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rebalancing through ‘expenditure reduction’ and ’expenditure switching’ (cf. Setser 
and Roubini 2005).  
It is worthwhile to recall here Keynes’s approach on how to stabilize 
international imbalances, which was based on a concerted effort to keep world 
aggregate demand high. Keynes did not trust the price mechanism as a means to 
restore financial balances and full employment: he stressed income and balance-sheet 
effects of exchange variations on top of uncertain price-elasticity and expenditure 
switching effects. Today, in a world of international financial flows and international 
outsourcing, a dollar drop is even less likely to reduce imbalances. For aiming at 
sufficiently large expenditure switching effects the dollar drop should be happening 
against nearly all surplus regions currencies, including the now pegged Asian 
currencies (and not just the renminbi). This would require an unlikely sweeping and 
coordinated change in policy in a number of Asian countries with different interests 
and constraints: with still fresh memories of the 1997-98 crisis, some Asian nations 
would be reluctant to moving into current account deficit and standing speculative 
financial flows in the appreciation process. Currency appreciation in Asia could 
result in greater financial instability if a small appreciation encouraged greater 
speculative capital flows into China and its neighbors, as well as if a large 
revaluation damaged the Chinese model of economic development (cf. Cooper 2005). 
The size of the expenditure switching effect is also questionable: dollar depreciation 
entails more expensive imports but with a significant share of US imports 
contributing towards the formation of US GNP (i.e., income earned by US companies 
abroad). As Kregel (2006) has stressed, an increasing portion of the US deficit reflects 
the existence of large foreign direct investment (FDI) by US companies as well as the 
imports of foreign affiliates selling in the US market: FDIs, outsourcing and the 
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globalization of international production may significantly reduce the impact of 
exchange rate adjustment on external accounts. In addition, if current account 
imbalances are primarily due to growth rates differentials, and if further dollar 
depreciation is likely to sustain, not reverse, such differentials, account imbalances 
are unlikely to disappear. 
In conclusion, the effectiveness of correcting imbalances through a slowdown of 
demand in the US and currencies’ appreciation in Asia  is questionable, and the 
related risks seem considerable for the world economy, as well as for Euroland—as 
discussed in the next section. 
 
The perilous navigation of the euro in the midst of global imbalances  
Within the policy framework described above, where imbalances should be 
adjusted through US fiscal correction (on the debtor side) and more flexible exchange 
rates (on the creditor side), Euroland has hardly any role to play, and it may well 
remain on the sidelines. Indeed, within a (Classical) framework where the recipe for 
international balance is a combination of balanced-budgets, price stability and 
flexible exchange rates, then Euroland, with its overall nearly balanced position, 
should have little to fear from imbalances, and its current policy approach might as 
well be seen as a template for the rest of the world. Yet, arguably, Euroland cannot 
rely on its current set of policies for protection from a deflation in the US. The effects 
of a US deflation on the euro area would be that of creating further strains on 
economic and political cohesion: without a sustained increase in domestic demand, 
Euroland countries will continue to struggle over export shares, engage in ’beggar-
thy-neighbor’ polices, and further sustain deflation. Many European officials in 
Brussels and Frankfurt as well as many of their economic advisers may continue to 
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believe that the answer is to reform welfare systems as well as product and labor 
markets to reduce rigidities and increase labor force participation, but they cannot 
dismiss the risk of a dramatic new strain on Euroland if world growth came to an 
abrupt halt. Euroland has not so far proved to be mature enough to counter serious 
external challenges. 
An equally risky scenario for Euroland, though considered by many as 
inevitable and even salutary, is the ’shock therapy’ of a dollar drop. Euro 
appreciation reduces Euroland’s international competitiveness and creates 
deflationary pressures, especially in those regions within the euro economy that 
remain largely based on exports. The outcome for the euro area could be particularly 
severe, given the lack of coordinated policy actions in the face of external shocks.  
Would this conclusion modify if the euro could challenge the dollar’s world 
dominance? Should the scenario prospected by Rubin, Orszag and Sinai materialize, 
and the dollar lose its world leadership, would the euro be capable to replace, or 
rival the dollar as the world key currency? A shift in currency portfolios would most 
likely (and problematically) cause euro appreciation. An appreciating currency, 
however, is not automatically a candidate to the key currency role in monetary 
relations, and a euro appreciation does not in any way imply that the euro might 
soon replace the dollar as the key world currency. In fact, the long dominance as the 
key world currency has not prevented the dollar from undergoing significant up and 
down movements, as portfolio allocation changed between US dollars, German 
marks, Swiss francs and Japanese yens, and largely in the interest of the US growth 
objective, as documented elsewhere in this volume. In the same fashion, the euro 
may well go through steep appreciation without fully or even partially replacing the 
dollar as the world monetary standard. 
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Exploring this aspect requires that the question of portfolio allocation be kept 
separate from the question of rivaling the dollar as the world key-currency. In fact, 
what we know of international currencies does not give much comfort to the 
possibility that the euro may soon replace the dollar and take world monetary 
leadership, as some fundamental conditions are missing. One should first distinguish 
a key currency (KC) from a high-hierarchy currency (HHC). In today’s international 
monetary system, the dollar is the KC and a few other currencies that are heavily 
traded are HHCs. A HHC is a high-quality substitute in international portfolios that 
takes a prominent role as a share in private and official portfolios and may be used as 
a temporary safe-heaven investment in times of uncertainty and of cyclical 
depreciation of the KC. A HHC’s perceived quality depends on the size and liquidity 
of its underlying money market, as well as by international reserve and/or current 
account surplus conditions (cf. Terzi 2006). By contrast, a KC is a currency that has 
international money status, i.e., it is used to settle international payments and is 
largely adopted as unit of account in international contracts. It is the currency with 
the highest degree of international ’moneyness’. 
Generally, the conditions for a currency to be used internationally include a 
high exposure to trade and capital flows, a large domestic market, a large financial 
market, and economic and political stability. The dollar has all these features and 
also a characteristic that is strongly linked to the role of KC, namely, the largest and 
most liquid capital market. It may thus seem that the euro is close to be a credible 
challenger of the dollar. Yet, there remain five areas where the euro does not score 
well. One pertains to a lack of progress in what we described above as a decisive 
feature of a KC, namely the quality of the capital market: in this regard, the European 
capital markets remain largely fragmented and are still far from being competitive in 
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breath, depth, and liquidity with the US market (cf. Kregel 2000). A second area of 
concern regards inertia, a typical disadvantage of the challenger with respect to the 
incumbent: this requires that a new contender offer substantial advantages over the 
incumbent to stimulate switching.  
The following three reasons pertain not so much to the list of characteristics that 
a currency must acquire to be a candidate to a KC role, but rather to the euro’s lack of 
quality related to its ‘supranational’ character. First, as powerfully argued by 
Goodhart in this volume, the separation between political and monetary authority in 
Euroland implies the absence of provisions as well as of possible funding (by a non-
existing euro federal treasury) of bailouts, and thus a risk of default of national debts 
no longer guaranteed by the national states is significantly higher. If the typically 
default-risk free investment medium of a currency area (consider the attractiveness 
of US government securities for private and official investors) is instead potentially 
risky and subject to investors’ apprehension in response to news about government 
ratings and ’excessive deficit procedures’, then the attractiveness of the euro as a KC 
inevitably suffers. 
Second, the lack of a single decision-making body that implements 
macroeconomic governance, and thus aims at Euroland’s growth damages the 
credibility of the euro: on this point, Cohen (2003) noted that in the euro economy ’in 
place of decisive management, market agents see fragmented decision making and a 
potential for chronic bickering.’ And finally, as also noted by Cohen (2003), an anti-
growth bias ’built into the institutional structure of the euro’ has a negative effect on 
prospective rates of return on euro-denominated assets.  
From these considerations, it seems that Euroland cannot at this stage escape 
from its original sin, that of a monetary union functioning with a largely incomplete 
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political union. Euroland has some features that permit to compare it with the US, 
such as economic size and price stability. Yet, there are other areas that put the euro 
at disadvantage in competing with the dollar as an official reserve asset as well as a 
denomination of international contracts.  
This may have a dismal consequence. Should the dollar really collapse for 
reasons of a confidence crisis, the euro would be totally unprepared to replace it in its 
KC role. Not all too different from the old German mark, all the euro – as a HHC! – 
could really offer is a safe-haven for international investors, with likely deflationary 
consequences due to euro appreciation. Vulnerability to external shock, which was 
presumably eliminated by the creation of the single currency, inevitably re-emerge as 
a result of the missing federal economic policy. A problem of the euro seems to be 
indeed that it may continue to look like the German mark rather than the dollar.10 
Considerations developed in the previous section suggest that a US demand 
drop or a dollar depreciation would both put Euroland under severe strain: the 
resulting slowdown in the demand for euro area exports would confront the euro 
economy with a deflation scenario. Likewise, a continuation of current imbalances 
does not seem favorable to the stability of the euro economy either. Having reached a 
size comparable to the US, Euroland still remains the sum of regional (national) 
economies, where national authorities and national policy actions of key individual 
members like Germany maintain a small open economy approach to their (now 
financially irrelevant) balance of payments, and where in case of difficulty they hope 
that the US market will bail them out. But while the US is unlikely to change its 
policy and Asia is in a good position to defend its current policy, the euro economy 
may soon find itself in a politically unsustainable situation: euro appreciation will 
have to be countered by downward adjustment of prices and wages to preserve 
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competitiveness, thus creating further pressure for euro disintegration (cf. Kregel 
2006). 
In sum, to address global imbalances from the standpoint of Euroland, there 
seems to be no alternative to a radical change in strategy towards policies that boost 
demand in slow-growth regions such as Japan, oil-exporting countries, and Euroland 
itself. With respect to Euroland, this might entail a profound review of current 
policy-making, well beyond the current emphasis on structural reforms.  
 
Will the euro build its own identity and rival the dollar?  
A critical review of the most prominent policies towards the challenge of ’global 
imbalances’ reveals a vision of economic history whereby economies move on long-
run paths and, when they temporarily deviate from long-run fundamentals, they 
ultimately converge back to trend and restore long-run equilibrium conditions. In 
this sense, a ’solution’ to the question of international payments imbalances should 
entail a mere ’rebalancing’ of payment flows, either through market mechanisms or 
’sound policies’. This is in shark contrast with an alternative vision, whereby 
economic development is intrinsically tied with the emergence of imbalances. 
Throughout history, differences in growth rates, differences in the degree of 
openness to trade and financial flows, current account imbalances and other 
asymmetries have been the norm rather than the exception. Imbalances may continue 
unchallenged for long periods as long as they are in the interest of the parties 
involved. Indeed, ’imbalances’ may be reversed not exclusively when they become 
unsustainable, but when growth patterns and national interests change. The current 
configuration, shadowing Keynes’s mechanism, has allowed the widening of 
imbalances, at the cost of an increasing dependence on the US domestic market 
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conditions, and while leaving a significant economic region of similar size, namely 
Euroland, on the sidelines. 
If the response to the risks posed by the current configuration of international 
payments imbalances is to prod adjustment on surplus regions, then, in the absence 
of an international mechanism managed by a multilateral system, candidates must be 
found among those who can afford the role of demand generators with no fear of 
engendering financial instability, and are willing, ultimately in their own best 
interest, to share with the US the ‘burden’—and enjoy the benefits—of generating 
world demand. 
The way out for the euro and for ’global imbalances’ could begin with Euroland 
exploiting the monetary power it has acquired with respect to the discontinued 
national currencies11 in order to modify its character into a growth-generating region, 
and being open to dare into the right-side court in Figure 13.1. This requires more 
structural policies than the individual countries’ initiatives can accomplish. 
Euroland’s priorities should be those of completing single market integration and of 
proceeding towards a more centralized coordination of macroeconomic governance 
that pursue the missing goal of euro policies, namely domestic demand growth. This 
mission could be accomplished more effectively if the acquired prominent role of the 
euro were exploited in such a way that the euro economy becomes capable to be 
another ’world demand generator’ in the global economy. This would entail being 
open to running external deficits as well as to exercise governance on the euro-dollar 
exchange rate.  
If the euro proceeds along its current path, it cannot realistically aspire to play 
the role of a KC and will inevitably continue to play, willingly or unwillingly, the 
role of a temporary safe-heaven currency. It will remain more similar to the German 
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mark than to the dollar. Instead, adopting a system of macroeconomic governance, as 
warranted by its new currency, is one of those structural reforms that should be 
given priority in the interest of Europe. It would also provide an additional means to 
correct global imbalances through a policy of growth rather than deflation. 
For Euroland to be part of the next round of trend changes in international financial 
flows, it should reconsider the role of its currency and reform its macroeconomic 
policy regime. The international challenge for the euro is to abandon its current role 
of a HC, inherited from the former German mark, before it can realistically play the 
role of a KC. One can envision the euro, injected into the world economy through 
current account deficits and/or a large-scale plan for development aid, acquiring a 
prominent role closer to that of the dollar. This could happen within a variety of 
arrangements including the setting of common growth and employment (and not 
only price stability) objectives to Euroland member countries, a centralized economic 
policy, and perhaps some degree of exchange rate coordination with the dollar 
(which is hard to envision in the present system where Euroland remains on the 
sideline of world demand generation). Priority to single market integration and 
further political union at the level of the euro area, and not necessarily at the broad 
EU level, may be needed too.12 In any event, a new international identity of the euro 
requires that Euroland develop improved means of internal macroeconomic 
governance aimed at securing domestic demand growth and accept responsibility for 
global growth to be shared with the US. This is the tough economic and political 
challenge ahead. 
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 Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook;  Asian Development Bank Key 
indicators 
Note: Emerging Asia includes People’ Republic of Cina, India, Republic of 
Korea, Indonesia, Taipei China, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong 
China, and Singapore. 
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1 A list of ‘true’ global economic imbalances should include growing income 
inequalities, widespread and persistent unemployment, unequal access to financial 
resources, and considerable disparities in countries’ vulnerability to external shocks. 
 
2 While in 1996 Milesi-Ferretti and Razin could still discuss current account 
sustainability with no reference to the US, three years later the scenario had changed. 
Amongst others, Blecker (1999, p.15) warned that the external position of the US was 
going to make the US dependent on international borrowing and vulnerable to 
international investors’ portfolio decisions. 
 
3 Public sector net borrowing equals the public sector deficit, while private sector net 
borrowing is the difference between total expenses (including investment) and total 
receipts of all households and businesses (equal to the difference between investment 
and saving in the private sector).  
 
4 Incidentally, at the time of the Asian crisis, global accounts and Asian deficits in 
particular were much less unbalanced than they are today. 
5 For Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003) the current system is a ’revived 
Bretton Woods’ system, reflecting a mutually beneficial two-way dependence 
between the US and Asia. 
 
6 This variety of the Classical view must assume that markets cannot be trusted to 
lead a timely, orderly adjustment. 
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7 For a critique of the view that fiscal deficits in the US (or Euroland) cause rising 
interest rates, see Terzi (2007). 
 
8 On this point, Cooper (20005) has argued that ’any attempt to reduce the US deficit 
abruptly, other than through a spontaneous but unlikely surge in domestic 
investment in many other countries, would undoubtedly produce a world recession.’ 
 
9 Paradoxically, critiques of Asian deficits as the supposed culprit of financial crisis in 
the late 1990s have turned into critiques of today’s Asian surpluses. 
 
10 Rotondi and Vaciago (2002) find that private agents regard the euro ‘as depending 
on the same fundamentals as the German mark” and suggest that ‘the euro is the D. 
Mark in disguise.’ 
 
11 Except for the German mark, pre-euro currencies could be seen as low-hierarchy 
currencies (at par with most Asian currencies today) constraining the viability of 
external deficits. 
12 In its pioneering role for full EMU in Europe, the euro area has a reason for paving 
the way to market integration and macroeconomic governance, even when other, 
non-euro EU countries may not feel the same urgency. 
